Murcho, Desidério Orlando Figueiredo2022-08-112022-08-112021MURCHO, D. O. F. Learning from Anselm ́s Argument. Manuscrito, v. 44, n. 4, p. 418-433, oct./dec. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/s9tZGjt3MS3DxpZNQLyHKHG/abstract/?lang=en>. Acesso em: 24 maio 2022.2317-630Xhttp://www.repositorio.ufop.br/jspui/handle/123456789/15137Anselm’s original argument for the existence of God seems to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is not easy to see what, if anything, is wrong with it; on the other, it seems incredible that the existence of a being like God could be proved entirely a priori. This paper presents a diagnosis of what seems to be wrong with Anselm’s original reasoning. The diagno- sis is general enough to be of use elsewhere, and it is this: concep- tual possibilities are inferential dead-ends, not free inference tick- ets to prove any substantial claim. It remains to be seen if other versions of Anselm’s original insight, both contemporary and not, fall into the same conceptual possibility trap.en-USabertoOntological argumentConceptual possibilityGodArtigo publicado em periodicoThis document is distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (CC-BY-NC). Fonte: o PDF do artigo.https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N4.DM